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CONTRACTS-1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL J. HARTMAN*

During the period covered by this survey article, there have not
been many cases in the field of contracts. In two of the cases the
only question before the court was the sufficiency of the evidence,
and in both of these cases the Tennessee Court of Appeals found
that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the lower court, without
going into an analysis of the evidence.1 Thus, there is no comment
that can properly be made concerning those cases. There were two
other cases, however, upon which some comment can properly be
made.
Contracts-Third Party Beneficiary-Right of County to Assert
Claim for Taxes as Beneficiary of Contract Between City and Tennessee Valley Authority
One area of contract law in which there has been considerable development, with attendant lack of definiteness as to the extent of the
scope, is found in third party beneficiary contracts. A recent attempt
to apply third party beneficiary doctrine to a novel type situation is
found in Rutherford County v. City of Murfreesboro.2 There Rutherford County as plaintiff invoked the third party beneficiary doctrine
in asserting a claim for tax money allegedly due it as a third party
beneficiary of a contract between the defendant, City of Murfreesboro,
and the TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority). The essential facts are
these. The defendant city entered into a contract with the TVA for
the purchase of electric power which would be sold by defendant
city to customers. The contract took effect in 1939. Under the contract, an electric system was established by the defendant as a separate department, with its funds kept separate from other funds of
defendant. Also, under the contract the defendent city was authorized
to transfer funds from the electric department to the general funds
of defendant to be used by it for municipal purposes. The amount
taken from the electric department funds was computed, in part, by
the application of county tax rates to the value of the electric system
when the county government did not levy a property tax upon the
electric system. Under the Tennessee Constitution and statute, this
electric system when used for municipal purposes, presumably was
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar
1. Dorrity v. Mann, 310 S.W.2d 191 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957); Pitt v. Bacherig,
307 S.W.2d 798 (Tenn. App. 1957).
2. 304 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. 1957). The plaintiff also invoked the doctrine of
a constructive trust, but the court held that there was no constructive trust.
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exempt from taxation by the plaintiff county.3 The county tax
equivalent taken from the electric department funds was retained by
the defendant city and no part of it was ever paid to the plaintiff
county.
In the case at hand, plaintiff county sought to recover the total
of the amount of county tax equivalent transferred from the electric
system funds to the general funds of the defendant city. The money in
controversy was collected from customers as payment for electricity
furnished them by defendant city. Plaintiff claimed this tax equivalent
to compensate plaintiff for the loss of county tax revenues by reason
of the immunity from taxation of this publicly owned electric system.
Plaintiff claimed that it was a third party beneficiary of the contract
between TVA and the defendant city, and that the contract showed an
intention to confer a benefit on plaintiff to the extent of the county
tax equivalent taken from the electric department funds and transferred to the general funds to be used for municipal purposes. The
defendant city demurred to plaintiff's bill of complaint on the ground
that plaintiff, not being a party to the contract, had not shown any
equitable interest in these revenues.
The lower court sustained the demurrer. In affirming the lower
court, the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied relief to plaintiff
county, holding that plaintiff was not a third party beneficiary of the
contract between the defendant city and the TVA. The court thought
that the contract did not show that the parties to it intended to confer the claimed benefit on plaintiff. The contract nowhere expressly
provided that the plaintiff county was to receive any benefits under
it. Nor did the contract expressly obligate the defendant to pay over
to the plaintiff the county tax equivalent taken from the electric department revenues. Moreover, the court was of the opinion that the
contract did not, by implication, grant such a benefit to the county.
Although defendant's electric system is presumably exempt from
taxation by the county, since it is used for a municipal purpose, nevertheless the law has imposed no duty on the defendant to assuage the
disappointment of the plaintiff county resulting from this loss of
revenue. Also, there is one particularly pertinent provision of the
contract defining the use of the amount in lieu of taxes transferred
from the electric funds to the general fund. It provides that the
transferred funds could be "used for any permissible municipal purpose." The court thought 'that clause in the contract negated plaintiff's contention that the contract conferred upon plaintiff the claimed
benefit. The payment of this money to the county would not be for
a municipal purpose, and the contract provided that the transferred
3.

TENN. CONST. art. 2,

§ 28;

TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-502

(1956).
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funds could only be used for municipal purposes.
Isn't it a strange coincidence, however, that the amount of funds
that could be transferred from the electric department funds to the
general fund under the contract between defendant city and the TVA
should be the county tax equivalent, if it was intended not to use
those transferred funds to compensate the plaintiff county for lost
4
taxes in that exact amount?
Plaintiff does not seem to fit into either of the traditional categories
of third party beneficiaries, as developed by Williston 5 and the Restatement of Contracts,6 that has an enforceable interest in a contract. Plaintiff does not seem to fit into the mold of a creditor beneficiary since the performance of the promise, by defendant, if any
there was, was not to satisfy an actual, or supposed or asserted duty
of the promisee (TVA) to the beneficiary (plaintiff).7 TVA owed
plaintiff no duty which defendant was undertaking to perform. Neither
does plaintiff seem to fit into the category of a donee beneficiary, since
there appears no purpose of the promisee (TVA) in obtaining any
promise of performance by defendant.to make a gift to the beneficiary (plaintiff).8 Hence, under the types of beneficiaries traditionally developed, plaintiff seems to fall into the category of an "incidental" beneficiary, which means he has no enforceable right at all.
But then, as we will see presently, the third party beneficiary doctrine
4. An amendment to the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, which became
effective after the effective date of the contract in question, now apparently
requires payment of a certain percentage of gross receipts to counties to make
up for tax losses, such as plaintiff county suffered in the case at hand. 48 STAT.
58 (1933), 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1952). Since this amendment became effective after
the contract in question, the court did not apply it to the facts at hand.
5. 2 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 356 (rev. ed. 1936).
6. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 133 (1932): Definition of Donee Beneficiary,
Creditor Beneficiary, Incidental Beneficiary.
"(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person
other than the promisee, that person is...:
(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in
view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee
in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance thereof is to
make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the
promisor to some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be
due from the promisee to the beneficiary;
(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears from the
terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and
performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted
duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of the beneficiary against
the promisee which has been barred by the Statute of Limitations or by a
discharge in bankruptcy, or which is unenforceable because of the Statute
of Frauds;
(c) an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated in Clause (a) nor
those stated in Clause (b) exist.
"(2) Such a promise as is described in Subsection (la) is a gift promise.
Such a promise as is described in Subsection (lb) is a promise to discharge
the promisee's duty."
7. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 133(1) (b) (1932).
8. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 133 (1) (a) (1932).
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continues to be progressive and the courts have given third party
beneficiaries enforceable rights even though the party could not
fit himself into either of the traditional categories of creditor or donee
beneficiary that have been used to give rights that were enforceable.
Contracts-Union Members as Third Party Beneficiary Under Collective BargainingContract Between Union and Employer-Interpretation of Control Provision Governing Vacation Pay.
Textile Workers Union of America v. Brookside Mills9 is a case coming in a much litigated area of third party beneficiary theory. There,
union members, along with the union, as plaintiffs, were permitted to
recover on a collective bargaining contract made by the union and the
employer defendant for the benefit of the individual members of the
union. Although the union joined with the individual members in
enforcing this contract, nevertheless this is one area where the union
members themselves, as plaintiffs, have successfully invoked third
party beneficiary doctrine, 0 thus expanding the horizons of this doctrine beyond the over-mechanical, restricted, traditional two categories
of donee and creditor beneficiaries which alone have enforceable
rights. While there are numerous cases sustaining the right of the
union member to sue as a third party beneficiary under collective
bargaining contracts made by the employer and the union, yet it is
far from realistic to say that the union member fits into either the
creditor beneficiary or the donee beneficiary mold.
In the case at hand, there was a suit to recover vacation pay allegedly due under a collective bargaining agreement made by the
defendant (employer) and the union. The suit was brought by certain employees and the union as a class suit on behalf of the individual
plaintiffs and all others similarly situated.
With respect to vacation pay, the contract provided, in part, that
all "employees who on June 1, 1950, and on June 1 of each succeeding
contract year, have continuous service with the employer will be paid
vacation pay according" to schedules based on length of service. The
employment of complaining employees had been terminated prior
to March 20, 1956, because of the employer's decision to discontinue
operations.
The defendant (employer) resisted the vacation pay claim of these
9. 309 S.W.2d 371 (Tenn. 1958).
10. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Sizemore, 258 Ala. 344, 62 So.2d 459
(1952); Leahy v. Smith, 137 Cal. App.2d 884, 290 P.2d 679 (1955) (non-union
employee enforced rights as third party beneficiary under collective bargaining agreement); Yazoo & MVX.R.R. v. Sideboard, 161 MViss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931)

(non-union employee maintained an action against railroad to recover compensation specified in the union contract.); On individual employees as third
party beneficiaries of collective bargaining agreements, see Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d
352 (1951); 4 CoRBIN, CONTmACTS § 782 (1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 379A
(rev.ed.).
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employees for the period in question on the ground that the contract
provision for the payment of vacation payment that the individual
must have been an employee on June 1, 1956, and have continuous
service as of that date; that since none of these complaining employees
were in the employment of the company at that time, they were not
entitled to vacation pay. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, insisted that
June 1 was not an elegibility date, but was a date fixed for a measure
of time within which to compute accumulated compensation earned
by the employees in the period of service. The collective bargaining
contract ran from June 1 until June 1 of each year.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the lower court, holding
that the employees were entitled to vacation pay for the period, although they were not employed on June 1. The court thought that the
contract did not require that the services be continuous up to June 1,
pointing out that the contract did not say "all who are employees on
June I," but says "all employees on June 1" shall receive certain
vacation pay. The contract was, thought the court, susceptible of
the construction that the continuous minimum service of six months
could be any time within the contract year between June 1 and June 1.
Moreover, past practice showed that the employer (defendant) had
paid vacation pay to employees who were temporarily laid off on June
1, but did not pay those persons whose services were terminated
through the fault or voluntary action of the employee.
This interpretation of the contract by the defendant (employer) in
paying vacation pay to employees who were temporarily laid off on
June 1 is, of course, entitled to much consideration in showing the
meaning of the contract to which legal effect should be given. The
practical interpretation given to a contract by the parties themselves
will be given great weight by the court." Moreover, as between two
possible and reasonable meanings that could be given a contract,
the court will adopt that one which is the less favorable in its legal
effect to the party who chose the words.'2 This rule may possibly
have, some application here, since the defendant (employer) presumably chose the words in which it agreed to pay vacation pay.
11. 3
ed.).

CoRnI,

12. 3 CORBIN,

ed.).

CONTRACTS § 558

(1951); 3

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§ 623 (rev.

CONTRACTS § 559

(1951); 3

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§ 621 (rev.

